Notes · An idea, not a shipped product
Where do bad agents go?
Berlin · 2026 · a working thesis, updated as I learn
An agent with real credentials takes real actions. It books, buys, emails, deploys, and commits on someone's behalf. When ordinary software misbehaves, we know what to do: roll it back, patch it, take it offline. An autonomous agent that acts for you needs somewhere to go when it gets it wrong — and right now, there is no "somewhere".
What's missing isn't smarter models. It's the accountability plumbing underneath them: a clear scope of what an agent may do, a record of what it actually did, a fast way to revoke its authority, and a path to correct the damage.
I keep calling the end state "correctional facilities for bad agents". Less metaphor, more checklist: sandboxed runtimes, permission budgets, complete action logs, credential revocation, incident review, and re-certification before an agent is released back into productive work. Not punishment — correction.
If I were building toward it, the first pieces are unglamorous: an audit trail every agent action is accountable to, budgets that cap what an agent can spend or touch, a kill switch that actually works, and a post-incident review that reads like a product surface rather than a postmortem nobody reads.
That's the problem I'm pointing my next decade at — at work, and in public. If you're building in the same space, or you need someone who takes agentic systems seriously in production, I'd like to hear from you.